We study single-good auctions in a setting where each player knows his own valuation only within a constant multiplicative factor δ ∈ (0, 1), and the mechanism designer knows δ. The classical notions of implementation in dominant strategies and implementation in undominated strategies are naturally extended to this setting, but their power is vastly different.
Introduction
The goal of this paper is to design mechanisms guaranteeing high social welfare in auctions of a single good whose players are Knightian.
Knightian Players
In a traditional single-good auction, each player i is assumed to know his true valuation for the good, θ i , exactly. The assumption, however, may be quite strong. For instance, can i be really sure that his true valuation is exactly $17,975 rather than -say-$18,001? If not, then how can his uncertainty be modeled?
A classical answer is to assume that i knows the single probability distribution D i from which his true valuation is drawn. More generally, Knight (1921) , and later on Bewley (2002) , suggested to assume that i knows only a set of distributions, one of which is guaranteed to be D i .
In an auction, however, from a strategic perspective a "Knightian player" could collapse each candidate distribution in his set to its expected value. Accordingly, without loss of generality, in a Knightian auction each player i only knows a set of integers, K i , guaranteed to contain his true valuation θ i . Therefore, K i is "the set of all possible candidates for θ i in i's mind", and will be referred to as i's candidate-valuation set.
Our Knightian Focus
Knightian players have received much attention in decision theory or in mechanisms with a single player. We are instead interested in studying the competition of multiple Knightian players in fullfledged mechanisms. Transforming rich (i.e., exact or Bayesian) knowledge into optimal mechanisms is important. But equally important is to understand whether there are good mechanisms when the players only have set-theoretic knowledge about themselves.
Specifically, we focus on Knightian auctions of a single good, adopting for simplicity sake a finite perspective. Namely,
• all valuations will be integers between 0 and a valuation bound B, and
• all mechanisms specify finitely many pure strategies for each player.
(Our results can however be extended to infinite settings as well.)
Knightian Mechanism Design
Intuitively, a mechanism cannot perform well in a Knightian setting where the candidate-valuation sets K i are too "spread out", but it might perform well when they are sufficiently "clustered". Accordingly, we believe that performance should be measured as a function of the "inaccuracy" of the players' knowledge.
Measuring inaccuracy. For a candidate-valuation set K i of a player i, we set
Then, it is immediately seen that δ i ∈ [0, 1] and that, because θ i ∈ K i , "player i knows θ i within a multiplicative factor of δ i ". We refer to δ i as i's individual inaccuracy (about his internal knowledge).
• Can real δ's be really large? Absolutely. The players' candidate-valuation sets may indeed be "very approximate". Consider a firm participating to an auction for an exclusive license to manufacture solar panels in the US for a period of 25 years. Even if the demand were precisely known in advance, and the only uncertainty came from the firm's ability to lower its costs of production via some breakthrough research, a firm's individual inaccuracy about its own true valuation for the license could easily exceed 0.5.
Solution Concepts
The analysis of every mechanism requires an underlying solution concept. As Knightian settings are settings of incomplete information (i.e., settings whose players do not know exactly the true valuations of their opponents), two solution concepts naturally apply: implementation in dominant strategies and implementation in undominated strategies. Of course, both solution concepts need to be properly extended to our setting, but this is naturally done (and in fact done in a way consistent with all prior works). In essence, a pure strategy s i of a player i is (very weakly) Knightian-dominant if it provides i with a utility at least as large as that of any other strategy t i of i, no matter what strategies his opponents may choose, and no matter what candidate in K i may be i's true valuation. A pure strategy s i of i is Knightian-undominated if i does not have any other strategy t i that (1) gives i utility at least as great as s i no matter what strategy subprofiles his opponents may use, and no matter what member of K i may be i's true valuation, and (2) gives i utility strictly greater than s i for at least some strategy subprofile of his opponents and some member of K i .
(The set of such undominated strategies under a mechanism M is denoted by UDed M i (K i ), or simply by UDed i (K i ) when M is clear from context.)
Informal Discussion of Our Results
How much social welfare can we guarantee in auctions? In traditional ones the answer is trivial: 100% in (very-weakly) dominant strategies, via the second-price mechanism. Things are quite different in Knightian auctions.
Dominant-Strategy Mechanisms Are Meaningful but Inadequate
Although a Knightian player "does not have a best valuation to bid", very-weakly-dominant strategies continue to be meaningfully defined in a Knightian auction. In a traditional auction the revelation principle (see Myerson (1981) ) guarantees that, as far as very-weakly-dominant strategies are concerned, it suffices to consider mechanisms that restrict a player's strategies to (reporting) single valuations. It is easy to see, however, that a natural exentension of the revelation principle continues to apply in Knightian auctions. Specifically, if a very-weakly-dominant strategy mechanism M with a given social welfare performance guarantee exists, then there also exists a Knightian-direct mechanism M , with the same performance, where, for every player i, (1) his pure strategy set consists of reporting sets of valuations, and (2) truthfully reporting his own candidate-valuation set K i is very-weakly dominant.
In principle, therefore, there may be a dominant-strategy mechanism that obtains all true candidate-valuation sets, K 1 , . . . , K n , and guarantees a high social welfare performance. Of course, given the inaccuracy of the players' knowledge of their own true valuations, one should expect some degradation of performance relative to the exact-valuation setting. However, one might conjecture that, in a Knightian auction with global inaccuracy δ, a dominant-strategy mechanism might be able to guarantee some δ-dependent fraction -such as (1−δ), (1−3δ), or (1−δ) 2 -of the maximum social welfare. We prove, however, that even such modest hopes are overly optimistic.
Theorem 1 (informal). For all n ≥ 1, δ ∈ (0, 1), and B > 3−δ 2δ , no (possibly probabilistic) very-weakly-dominant-strategy-truthful mechanism M n,δ,B can guarantee a fraction of the maximum social welfare greater than 1 n + 3−δ 2δ
+ 1 B in any Knightian auction with n players, valuation bound B, and inaccuracy parameter δ.
As a relative measure of the quality of the players' self knowledge, δ should be independent of the magnitude of the players' valuations. But to ensure an upper bound on the players' valuations, B should be large. Accordingly, the above result essentially implies that any very-weakly-dominantstrategy mechanism can only guarantee a fraction ≈ 1 n of the maximum social welfare. However, such a fraction can be trivially achieved by the "naive" very-weakly-dominant-strategy mechanism that, dispensing with all bids, assigns the good to a random player! Thus, Theorem 1 essentially says that no dominant-strategy mechanism can be smart: "the optimal one can only be as good as good as the stupid naive one". In other words, dominant strategies are intrinsically linked to each player having exact knowledge of either (1) his own valuation, or (2) the unique possible distribution from which his own valuation has been drawn.
By showing the limitations of dominant strategies in Knightian auctions, Theorem 1 opens the door to alternative solution concepts: in particular, to implementation in undominated strategies. We actually believe that the Knightian setting will provide a new and vital role for this natural and non-Bayesian implementation notion.
The Power of Deterministic Undominated-Strategy Mechanisms
We tightly characterize the power of implementation in undominated strategies via deterministic mechanisms in Knightian auctions. First of all, without much difficulty, we show that the secondprice mechanism (although no longer dominant-strategy) guarantees a relatively good fraction of the maximum social welfare in undominated strategies, despite the fact that it does not leverage any information about δ. Second, more importantly and perhaps more surprisingly, we prove that no deterministic undominated-strategy mechanism can do better, even with full knowledge of δ.
The (good) performance of the second-price mechanism.
Theorem 2 (informal). In any Knightian auction with n players, valuation bound B, and inaccuracy parameter δ, the second-price mechanism guarantees a fraction of the maximum social welfare that is
The course intuition behind Theorem 2 is clear:
1 We note that when breaking ties at random, the performance of the second-price mechanism is only marginally better: namely, it guarantees a fraction of the maximum social welfare exactly equal to (
"It is obvious that each player i should only consider bidding a value v i inside his own candidate-valuation set K i . It is further obvious that the worst possible gap between the maximum and the actual social welfare is achieved in the following case. Let w be the winner in the second-price mechanism, and let h, h = w, be the player with the largest candidate valuation. Player w bids v w = max K w , and player h bids v h = min K h (and v w only slightly exceeds v h ). In this case it is obvious that the second-price mechanism guarantees at most a fraction ≈ 1−δ 1+δ 2 of the maximum social welfare. "
Of course, things are a bit more complex. In particular, the fact that a player i should only consider bids in K i (actually more precisely between min K i − 1 and max K i + 1) requires a proof.
The optimality of the second-price mechanism.
Theorem 3 (informal). For all n ≥ 2, δ ∈ (0, 1), and B ≥ 5 δ , no deterministic undominatedstrategy mechanism M n,B,δ can guarantee a fraction of the maximum social welfare greater than
in any Knightian auction with n players, valuation bound B, and inaccuracy parameter δ.
Theorem 3 is harder to prove, as is to be expected from an impossibility result. Indeed, its statement applies to all undominated-strategy mechanisms, so that the revelation principle is no longer relevant. Thus, to prove Theorem 3, rather than analyzing a single mechanism (the "direct truthful" one), in principle we should consider all possible mechanisms. Considering only those where a player's strategies consist of valuations, or even sets of valuations, is not sufficient. We would have to consider mechanisms with arbitrary strategy sets. Establishing Theorem 3 thus requires new techniques, informally discussed in Section 1.6, and formally provided in Section 6.
The Greater Power of Probabilistic Undominated-Strategy Mechanisms
The second-price mechanism "ignores the global inaccuracy parameter". It simply guarantees a fraction ≈ ( 1−δ 1+δ ) 2 of the maximum social welfare in any Knightian auction, no matter what the value of δ happens to be. It is thus legitimate to ask whether knowing δ (or a close upper-bound to it) enables one to design mechanisms with better efficiency guarantees. We prove that this is indeed the case: we explicitly construct a probabilistic mechanism that, by properly leveraging δ, outperforms the second-price mechanism, and then we prove that our mechanism is essentially optimal.
Theorem 4 (informal). For all n ≥ 2, δ ∈ (0, 1), and B, there exists a mechanism M (δ) opt that guarantees a fraction of the maximum social welfare that is at least
Theoretical significance. Theorem 4 highlights a novelty of the Knightian setting: namely, probabilism enhances the power of implementation in undominated strategies even for guaranteeing social welfare. By contrast, probabilism offers no such advantage in the exact-valuation world, since the deterministic second-price mechanism already guarantees maximum social welfare.
We conjecture that, in Knightian settings, probabilistic mechanisms will enjoy a provably better performance in other applications as well.
Practicality. The proof of Theorem 4 is the technically hardest one in this paper. Nonetheless, we would like to emphasize that M (δ) opt is very practically played, as it requires almost no computation from the players, and a very small amount of computation from the mechanism. In addition, its performance is practically preferable to that of the second-price mechanism. For instance, when δ = 0.5, M (δ) opt guarantees a social welfare that is at least five times higher than that of the secondprice mechanism when there are 2 players, and at least three times higher when there are 4 players. opt is essentially optimal among all mechanisms, probabilistic or not.
Theorem 5 (informal). For all n ≥ 2, δ ∈ (0, 1), and B ≥ 5 δ , no (possibly probabilistic) undominatedstrategy mechanism M n,δ,B can guarantee a fraction of the maximum social welfare greater than
In sum, our results prove that mechanism design in the Knightian setting is quite possible. Some of the old techniques no longer work, but it is still possible to construct good mechanisms.
Two Techniques of Independent Interest
New ventures require new tools. Let us thus highlight two techniques, crucial to our present endeavor, that we believe will prove useful also to future work in Knightian mechanism design.
The Undominated Intersection Lemma. To prove Theorem 3 and Theorem 5, we establish a basic structural relation between candidate-valuation sets and undominated strategies. The simplest one of course would be UDed i (K i ) = K i . This relation, however, is generally false, even when the strategies available to each player consist of individual valuations between 0 and B. 2 A second relation, implied by the previous one, is the following:
It is not clear, however, whether this second relation always holds. 3 Indeed, an undominatedstrategy mechanism may have to specify its strategy sets in quite unforseen ways. Therefore, as soon as K i and K i are even slightly different, their corresponding UDed i (K i ) and UDed i ( K i ) may in principle be totally unrelated. We prove, however, that the following simple variation of the second relation holds for any possible mechanism. Informally, 2 Indeed a mechanism does not need to interpret a bid vi reported by i as i's true valuation θi. For instance, the mechanism could first replace each vi by π(vi) where π is some fixed permutation over {0, 1, . . . , B} and then run the second-price mechanism as if each player i had bid π(vi). In this case, after UDed(Ki) has been correctly computed, it will look very different from Ki.
3 It would actually hold if the total number of coins usable by the players for choosing their mixed strategies were upper-bounded by a fixed constant.
For any mechanism, probabilistic or not, if K i and K i have at least two values in common, then there exist two (possibly mixed) "almost payoff-equivalent" strategies σ i and σ i respectively having UDed i (K i ) and UDed i ( K i ) as their support.
This relation actually suffices for deriving all our impossibility results.
The Distinguishable Monotonicity Lemma. To prove that a given social choice function can be implemented in undominated strategies we are happy to consider mechanisms using a restricted kind of strategies and allocation functions, but we must achieve a delicate balance. On one hand, these restrictions should ensure that the undominated strategies corresponding to a given candidatevaluation set can be characterized in a way that is both conceptually simple and easy to work with. On the other hand, they should be sufficient for proving our Theorem 2 and Theorem 4.
Specifically, we consider mechanisms whose strategies consist of individual valuations (i.e., the pure strategies of each player coincide with {0, . . . , B}) and whose allocation functions are restrictions (to {0, . . . , B} n ) of integrable functions (over [0, B] n ) satisfying a suitable monotonicity property. A simple lemma, the Distinguishable Monotonicity Lemma, then guarantees that, for all candidate-valuation set K i ,
Although concerned with undominated strategies, when applied to the case of players knowing their valuations exactly, the Distinguishable Monotonicity Lemma is a strengthening of a classical lemma characterizing (very weakly) dominant-strategy-truthful mechanisms in traditional singlegood auctions. Further, the Distinguishable Monotonicity Lemma actually applies to all singleparameter domains, not just single-good auctions (the same way that the classical lemma does). We thus believe that this simple lemma will be useful beyond the immediate needs of this paper.
Prior Work with Knightian Players
As already mentioned, Knightian players have received a lot of attention in decision theory. In particular, Aumann (1962) , Dubra et al. (2004 ), Ok (2002 and Nascimento (2011) investigate decision with incomplete orders of preferences.
The merits of different ways for a Knightian player to "condense" his set of possible values into a meaningfully and deterministically-chosen single value have been explored. For example, Danan (2010) studies the average, Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) the maximum, and Schmeidler (1989) the Choquet expectation.
Other authors have studied mechanisms where a single Knightian player is called to accept or reject a given offer; in particular Lopomo et al. (2009) studied the rent-extraction problem in such a setting.
Less relevant to our work, several authors have considered individual Bayesians to model a player's uncertainty: for instance, Sandholm (2000) , Porter et al. (2008) , and Feige and Tennenholtz (2011) . Also, others have studied equilibrium models with unordered preferences: for instance MasColell (1974) , Gale and Mas-Colell (1975) , Shafer and Sonnenschein (1975) , and Fon and Otani (1979) . More recently, Rigotti and Shannon (2005) have characterized the set of equilibria in a financial market problem.
Single-Good Knightian Auctions
We separate every auction into two parts, a context and a mechanism.
Knightian Contexts. A Knightian context C has the following components. 4 • [n] = {1, 2, . . . , n}, the set of players.
• {0, 1, . . . , B}, the set of all valuations, where B is the valuation bound.
• δ ∈ (0, 1], the inaccuracy of the context.
• K, the profile of candidate-valuation sets, where, for all i,
• θ, the profile of true valuations, where each θ i ∈ K i .
• Ω = {0, 1, . . . , n} × R n , the set of outcomes. If (a, P ) ∈ Ω, then we refer to a as an allocation and to P as a profile of prices. (If a = 0 then the good remains unallocated, else player a wins the good.) • u, the profile of utility functions. Each u i maps any outcome (a, P ) to θ i − P i if a = i, and to −P i otherwise.
Notice that C is fully specified by n, B, δ, K, and θ, that is, C = (n, B, δ, K, θ).
Knowledge. In a context C = (n, B, δ, K, θ) each player i only knows K i and that θ i ∈ K i , and a mechanism designer only knows n, B, and δ.
Notation. The set of all contexts with n players, valuation bound B, and inaccuracy δ, is denoted by C n,B,δ . The social welfare of an outcome (a, P ) relative to true-valuation profile θ, SW(θ, (a, P )), is defined to be θ a . The maximum social welfare of a true-valuation profile θ, MSW(θ), is defined to be max i∈[n] θ i .
Mechanisms. Our mechanisms for Knightian contexts are finite and ordinary. Indeed a mechanism for C n,B,δ is a pair M = (S, F ) where
• S = S 1 × · · · × S n is the set of all pure strategy profiles of M , and • F : S → {0, 1, . . . , n} × R n is M 's outcome function. Set S is always finite and non-empty, and function F may be probabilistic.
Notation.
• We denote pure strategies by Latin letters, and possibly mixed strategies by Greek ones.
• If M = (S, F ) is a mechanism and s ∈ S, then by F A i (s) and F P i (s) we respectively denote the probability that the good is assigned to player i and the expected price paid by i under strategy profile s. For mixed strategy profile σ ∈ ∆(S), we define
, where s ← σ denotes that "s is drawn from the mixed strategy σ".
• We refer to F A as the allocation function of M . More generally, we say that f :
Knightian Dominance
In extending the three classical notions of dominance to our approximate valuation setting, the obvious constraint is that when each candidate-valuation set K i consists of a single element, then all extended notions must collapse to the original ones.
Definition 4.1. In a mechanism M = (S, F ) for C n,B,δ , let K be a profile of candidate-valuation sets, i a player, σ i a (possibly mixed) strategy of i, and s i a pure strategy of i. Then, relatively to K i , we say that
The (very-weakly-)dominant strategies for K i and K respectively are
The undominated strategies for K i and K respectively are
We use the notation Dnt i instead of, say, "VWDnt i " because we have no need to define weaklydominant or strictly-dominant strategies in a Knightian setting. (Indeed, Theorem 1 shows that even very-weakly-dominant strategies cannot guarantee any non-trivial performance.)
We use the notation UDed i instead of, say, "UWDed i ", because (as in the classical setting) implementation in undominated strategies is defined for weak dominance. 5 The above extensions of the classical notions are quite straightforward. Only to the extension of weak dominance might require some attention. 6 Finally, let us note that the following obviously holds.
5 Formal Statement and Proof of Theorem 1
, and all (possibly probabilistic) very-weaklydominant-strategy-truthful mechanisms M = (S, F ) for C n,B,δ , there exists a context (n, B, δ, K, θ) ∈ C n,B,δ such that
Proof. Fix arbitrarily n, δ, and B such that B > 3−δ 2δ . We start by proving a separate claim. Essentially, as soon as a player reports a δ-interval whose center is sufficiently high, his winning probability remains constant. (Actually the same holds for his price, although we do not care about it.) Claim 5.1. For all players i, all integers x ∈ ( 3−δ 2δ , B], and all subprofiles K −i of δ-approximate candidate-valuation sets,
Proof of Claim 5.1. Because K i may coincide with δ[x], and because when this is the case reporting δ[x] very-weakly dominates reporting δ[x + 1], the following inequality must hold:
Because K i may coincide with δ[x + 1], and because when this is the case reporting δ[x + 1] very-weakly dominates reporting δ[x], the following inequality also holds:
Thus, setting θ i = x in Eq. 5.1 and θ i = x + 1 in Eq. 5.2, and summing up (the corresponding terms of) the resulting inequalities, the F P i price terms and a few other terms cancel out yielding the following inequality:
Also, setting θ i = x(1 + δ) in Eq. 5.1 and θ i = (x + 1)(1 − δ) in Eq. 5.2, 7 and summing up the resulting inequalities we obtain the following one:
. Thus from Eq. 5.4 we deduce
Together, Eq. 5.3 and Eq. 5.5 imply our claim.
Let us now finish the proof of Theorem 1. Choose the profile of candidate-valuation sets K + 1. By averaging, because the summation of F A i ( K) over i ∈ [n] cannot be greater than 1, there must exist a player j such that F A j ( K) ≤ 1/n. Without loss of generality, let such player be player 1. Then, invoking Claim 5.1 multiple times we have
Now suppose that the true candidate-valuation profile of the players is
as desired.
7
The hypothesis x > 3−δ 2δ
implies that x > 1 2δ
, which in turn implies that, under the above choices, θi ∈ δ[x] and θ i ∈ δ[x + 1].
The Undominated Intersection Lemma
Lemma 6.1 (Undominated Intersection Lemma). Let M = (S, F ) be a mechanism, i a player, and K i and K i two candidate-valuation sets of i such that
(Actually the same holds for F P , although we do not care about it.) Proof. Let x i and y i be two distinct integers in K i ∩ K i , and, without loss of generality, let x i > y i .
Recall that, by Fact 4.2, UDed i (K i ) and UDed i ( K i ) are both nonempty. If there exists a common (pure) strategy s i ∈ UDed i (K i ) ∩ UDed i ( K i ), then setting σ i = σ i = s i completes the proof. Therefore, let us assume that UDed i (K i ) and UDed i ( K i ) are disjoint, and let s i be a strategy in UDed i (K i ) but not in UDed i ( K i ). The finiteness of the strategy set S i implies the existence of a strategy
i , where X is a subset of S i . Invoking again the disjointness of the two undominated strategy sets, we deduce that for each j ∈ X there exists a strategy τ
is a mixed strategy as desired.
For the same reason, we can also find some
in this fashion, "jumping" back and forth between ∆(UDed i (K i )) and ∆(UDed i ( K i )), we obtain an infinite chain of not necessarily distinct strategies, {σ
Since weak dominance implies very-weak dominance, we have that for all s −i ∈ S −i and all k ∈ N:
Thus, for any z i ∈ K i ∩ K i , setting θ i = θ i = z i we see that, for all s −i ∈ S −i and for k = 1, 2, . . .
That is, we have an infinite and non-decreasing sequence that is bounded from above. (Indeed, z i ≤ B, F A i ranges between 0 and 1, and each price is non-negative.) Thus, since x i , y i ∈ K i ∩ K i , for any ε > 0 there exists a (sufficiently large) k such that
When Si is not finite, we need of course to assume that the mechanism is bounded; see Jackson (1992). 9 Note that, while we have only defined what it means for a pure strategy to be dominated by a possibly mixed one, the definition trivially extends to the case of dominated strategies that are mixed, as for "τi 
Now consider the following two linear functions:
We have showed that |g(x i ) − h(x i )| < ε and |g(y i ) − h(y i )| < ε . We now use the fact that if two linear functions are close at two points, they must have similar slopes. In particular,
The proof is complete by taking ε = ε|x i − y i |/2.
Formal Statement and Proof of Theorem 3
Theorem 3. For all n ≥ 1, δ ∈ (0, 1), B ≥ 5 δ , and all deterministic mechanisms M = (S, F ) for C n,B,δ , there exist a context (n, B, δ, K, θ) ∈ C n,B,δ and a strategy profile s ∈ UDed(K) such that: Choose ε such that 1 n + ε < 1. Then (the Undominated Intersection) Lemma 6.1 guarantees that ∀i ∈ [n] ∃σ i ∈ ∆(UDed i (δ[x])) and σ i ∈ ∆(UDed i (δ[y])) such that ∀s −i ∈ S −i : (7.1) A (σ 1 , . . . , σ n ), where the randomness comes from the mixed strategy profile since M is a deterministic mechanism. Since the good will be assigned with a total probability mass of 1, by averaging, there exists a player j such that F A j (σ 1 , . . . , σ n ) ≤ 1 n : that is, player j wins the good with probability at most 1 n . Without loss of generality, let j = 1. In particular, there exist
Now consider the allocation distribution F
n . This together with Eq. 7.1 implies that F A 1 (σ 1 , s −1 ) ≤ 1 n + ε < 1. In turn, this implies that there exists a pure strategy s 1 ∈ UDed 1 (δ[x]) such that, setting s def = (s 1 , s −1 ), F A 1 (s) = 0. Now we construct the desired δ-approximate candidate-valuation profile K and the true-valuation profile θ as follows:
and
Note that s ∈ UDed(K), θ ∈ K, and MSW(θ) = (1 + δ)x . Since F A 1 (s) = 0,
Thus the theorem holds.
Formal Statement and Proof of Theorem 5
Theorem 5. For all n ≥ 1, δ ∈ (0, 1), B ≥ 5 δ , and all (deterministic or probabilistic) mechanisms M = (S, F ) for C n,B,δ , there exist a context (n, B, δ, K, θ) ∈ C n,B,δ and a strategy profile s ∈ UDed(K) such that . Then again (1 − δ)y belongs to {0, 1, . . . , B} and δ[x] and δ[y] both contain the following two integer points: x(1 − δ) and x(1 − δ) + 1.
Since we always have (1 − δ)y < (1 − δ)y + 1, we can choose ε ∈ (0, 1 − 1 n ) such that
Then (the Undominated Intersection) Lemma 6.1 guarantees that F A (σ 1 , . . . , σ n ). By averaging, there exists some player j such that F A j (σ 1 , . . . , σ n ) ≤ 1 n . Thus, by our choice of ε and Eq. 8.2, we have that
Again consider the allocation distribution
This implies that there exists a pure strategy profile s = (s 1 , s −1 ) that is in the support of (σ 1 , σ −1 ) -and thus in
10 Very informally, the only differences are that the allocation distribution F A (σ 1 , . . . , σ n ) now depends also on the "coin tosses of the mechanism", and that one can no longer guarantee the existence of a pure strategy s such that F A 1 (s) = 0.
Notice that s ∈ UDed(K), θ ∈ K, and MSW(θ) = (1 + δ)x . We now show that s, K, and θ satisfy the desired Eq. 8.1:
The Distinguishable Monotonicity Lemma
Let us recall a traditional way to define auction mechanisms from suitable allocation functions.
Definition 9.1. If f : [0, B] n → [0, 1] n is an integrable 11 allocation function, then we denote by M f the mechanism (S, F ) where S = {0, 1, . . . , B} n and F is so defined: on input bid profile v ∈ S, • with probability f i (v) the good is assigned to player i, and
• if player i wins, he pays
(and all other players pay P j = 0 for j = i.)
Remark 9.2.
• M f is deterministic if and only if f ({0, 1, . . . , B} n ) ⊆ {0, 1} n .
• For all player i and bid profile v, the expected price
• We stress that M f continues to have the discrete strategy space S = {0, 1, . . . , B} n . The analysis over a continuous domain for f is only a tool for proving the lemma.
• In the exact-valuation world, it is well known that a single-good auction mechanism M is very-weakly dominant-strategy-truthful if and only if M = M f for some function f that is (integrable and) monotonic, that is, such that each f i is non-decreasing in the bid of player i for any fixed choice of bids of all other players.
We now slightly strengthen the notion of monotonicity.
Definition 9.3. Let f : [0, B] n → [0, 1] n be a allocation function. For d ∈ {1, 2}, we say that f is d-distinguishably monotonic (d-DM, for short) if f is integrable, monotonic, and satisfying the following "distinguishability" condition:
Distinguishability is certainly an additional requirement to monotonicity, but actually is a mild one. (Indeed, the second-price mechanism is 2-DM and, if ties are broken at random, even 1-DM. 12 ) Yet, in our Knightian setting, this mild additional requirement is quite useful for "controlling" the undominated strategies of a mechanism, and thus for engineering implementations of desirable social choice functions in undominated strategies.
Lemma 9.4 (Distinguishable Monotonicity Lemma). If f is a d-DM allocation function, then M f is such that, for any player i and δ-approximate candidate-valuation profile K,
, and
(Above, min K i and max K i respectively denote the minimum and maximum integers in K i .)
Then, to establish our lemma it suffices to prove that, ∀i ∈ [n] and ∀d ∈ {1, 2}, the following four properties hold:
3. There is a strategy sub-profile v −i for which v ⊥ i is strictly better than every
There is a strategy sub-profile v −i for which v i is strictly better than every
Proof of Property 1. Fix any (pure) strategy sub-profile v −i ∈ S −i for the other players and any possible true valuation
12 For example, the second-price mechanism with lexicographic tie-breaking is the mechanism M f where f is defined as follows: ∀i ∈ [n] and ∀v ∈ {0, . . . , B} n ,
To see that this mechanism is 2-DM, consider two bids vi and v i of player i that are at least a distance of two apart; by choosing a strategy sub-profile for the other players where the highest bid falls between vi and v i , we can ensure that the desired integral is positive. A slightly more refined argument shows that the second-price mechanism breaking ties at random is 1-DM. Thus the lemma holds.
Now note that, since
θ i ∈ K i , θ i − v ⊥ i = θ i − min K i ≥ 0; moreover, by the monotonicity of f , whenever z ≥ v i , it holds that f i (z, v −i ) ≥ f i (v). We deduce that Eu i θ i , F (v ⊥ ) ≥ Eu i θ i , F (v) .
Formal Statement and Proof of Theorem 2
Theorem 2. Let M 2P = (S 2P , F 2P ) be the second-price mechanism with any deterministic tie-breaking rule. Then, for all contexts (n, B, δ, K, θ) and all strategy profiles v ∈ UDed(K):
Proof. Since K is a δ-approximate candidate-valuation set, for each player i let x i be such that
Then, in light of (the Distinguishable Monotonicity) Lemma 9.4 and the previous observation that F A 2P is a 2-DM allocation function, we have that, for each player i:
Let i * be the player with the highest true valuation and j * the player winning the good under the bid profile v, that is, θ i * = max i θ i and v j * = max j v j .
If i * = j * then we are done. If i * = j * , we need to show that θ j * is not much lower than θ i * . From Eq. 10.1 we know that (1 − δ)x i * − 1 ≤ v i * and v j * ≤ (1 + δ)x j * + 1. Because j * is the winner, we also know that v i * ≤ v j * . Combining these facts and "removing floors and ceilings" we have (1 − δ)x i * ≤ (1 + δ)x j * + 2; equivalently,
Since we also know that θ j * ≥ (1 − δ)x j * and (1 + δ)x i * ≥ θ i * , we obtain:
Thus, the theorem holds.
Remark 10.1. If M 2P = (S 2P , F 2P ) were the second-price mechanism breaking ties at random (assigning a positive probability to each tie), then we can use a proof analogous to the one above, with the only difference being that F A 2P is 1-DM (instead of only 2-DM), and invoking the stronger inclusion of (the Distinguishable Monotonicity) Lemma 9.4, to show the following, stronger lower bound:
Formal Statement and Proof of Theorem 4
Theorem 4. ∀n, ∀δ ∈ (0, 1), and ∀B, there exists a mechanism M (δ) opt = (S, F ) such that for every δ-approximate candidate-valuation profile K, every true-valuation profile θ ∈ K, and every strategy profile v ∈ UDed(K):
We break the construction of M
opt and its analysis into several steps. At the highest level, in order to leverage our Distinguishable Monotonicity Lemma, and thus choose M (δ)
Our Allocation Function
Given δ, we find it natural to choose an allocation function f (δ) that is symmetric: that is, f (δ) (v ) = f (δ) (v) whenever the profile v consists of a permutation of the bids in v. In other words, "renaming the players should not change the probability of allocating the good to a given player".
Also, when some of the players' bids are much smaller than others, we find it intuitive to interpret the lower bids as being more likely to come from players with lower valuations. Accordingly, our f (δ) gives positive probability only to the highest bids. However, when the highest bids are close to each other, we find it hard to "infer" which one has been chosen by the player with the highest true valuation: after all, we are in a Knightian model. Therefore our f (δ) assigns the good to a randomly chosen high-bidding player. A bit more precisely, our f (δ) deterministically derives from the players' bids a threshold, and probabilistically chooses the winning player only among those bids lying above the threshold. To achieve optimality, however, one must be much more careful in allocating probability mass, and some complexities should be expected. Let us now proceed more formally.
Let D δ be the always positive quantity defined as follows: for all δ ∈ (0, 1),
where n * is the index in {1, 2, . . . , n} such that
where π is any permutation of the players such that
We refer to n * j=1 z j n * +D δ as the bid threshold, to players 1, . . . , n * as the candidate winners, and to the players n * + 1, . . . , n as the losers.
Our Allocation Function is Well Defined
Lemma 11.2. f (δ) is an allocation function.
Proof. Assume, without loss of generality, that z 1 ≥ z 2 ≥ · · · ≥ z n .
We first prove that n * exists and is unique, and begin with its existence. Note that there exists an integer n in [n] such that
Indeed, Eq. 11.3 vacuously holds for n = n. Now letting n be the least such integer, the following two facts hold:
Because z is non-decreasing, the last inequality implies z n > n −1
Invoking again the monotonicity of z, we have
Thus, 11.3 and 11.6 imply that choosing n * = n satisfies Eq. 11.2. Next, we prove that n * is unique. Suppose by way of contradiction that there exist two integers n ⊥ and n , n ⊥ < n , both satisfying Eq. 11.2. Now define
Invoking Eq. 11.2 with n ⊥ and n , we deduce that for i ∈ {n ⊥ + 1, . . . , n },
Averaging over all z i such that i ∈ {n ⊥ + 1, . . . , n }, we get
Let us now show that the second inequality of Eq. 11.7 contradicts the first:
The contradiction establishes the uniqueness of n * .
Let ("player n join the game bidding")
That is, the bid threshold continues to be n j=1 z j n +D δ , and the set of winners continues to be {1, 2, . . . , n }. Thus n is a loser and inequality 11.9 holds.
Let now (player n join the game bidding) z n > n j=1 z j n +D δ and assume, for the sake of contradiction, that f (δ) n (z −n , z n ) = 0, that is, that player n is a loser. Then, letting n * be the new number of candidate winners, by definition:
Thus, "ignoring n" we get
That is, n * is also the number of candidate winners under the hypothesis of CLAIM 1. Thus, the uniqueness of n * implies n * = n . In turn, this implies that z n ≤ n j=1 z j n +D δ , a contradiction. This contradiction proves that n is a winner. Thus the claimed inequality (11.10) holds.
Thanks to CLAIM 1, to establish the monotonicity of f (δ) it suffices to prove that
Notice that for such z ⊥ n and z n , player n is always a candidate winner. Therefore, let {1, . . . , n ⊥ , n} and {1, . . . , n , n} be the winners when the bid profiles are (z −n , z ⊥ n ) and (z −n , z n ) respectively. We now relate n ⊥ and n .
Proof of CLAIM 2. Assume by way of contradiction that n ⊥ < n . We proceed in a way similar to the proof of Lemma 11.2. Set
Since n ⊥ ≤ i < n implies that player i is a loser when the bid profile is (z −n , z ⊥ n ) and a winner when the bid profile is (z −n , z n ), we have
Averaging over all i such that n ⊥ ≤ i < n we get:
Focusing on the second inequality of (11.12), we have
Thus, since z ⊥ n < z n , the second inequality (11.12) contradicts the first. The contradiction establishes that n ⊥ ≥ n as claimed.
We now use the fact that n ⊥ ≥ n to prove Eq. 11.11, as desired. If n ⊥ = n , then, for both (z −n , z n ) and (z −n , z ⊥ n ), the set of candidate winners is {1, 2, . . . , n ⊥ , n}. Thus, letting n * = n ⊥ + 1 = n + 1 be the number of candidate winners, we get
Averaging over all z i such that n < i ≤ n ⊥ we get:
(11.14)
, we now do the final calculation:
The last inequality has been derived using the fact that z n − z ⊥ n ≥ 0 and (by Eq. 11.14) the fact that
Combining the last two chains of inequalities yields (11.16) Let us now argue that Eq. 11.15 holds by arbitrarily fixing v and i and showing that it is impossible to construct a "bad" θ so as to violate Eq. 11.15.
In trying to construct a "bad" θ, it suffices to choose θ j (for j = i) to be as small as possible, since θ j only appears on the left-hand side with a positive coefficient. For θ i , however, we may want to choose it as large as possible if
, or as small as possible otherwise. So there are two extreme θ's.
Considering these extreme choices, we conclude that no θ contradicts Eq. 11.15 if:
Simplifying the above equations, Eq. 11.15 holds if both the following inequalities hold: (11.18) Note that Eq. 11.18 holds because it is implied by the hypothesis that f is δ-good; note also that Eq. 11.17 holds because it is implied by Eq. 11.18. Indeed, since
2 < 1 for all δ ∈ (0, 1),
Thus both Eq. 11.15 and both our lemma and Theorem 4 hold.
The Computational Efficiency of M (δ) opt
Finally, we wish to clarify that, although M (δ) opt = M f (δ) = (S, F ) is not as simple as the second-price mechanism, it can still be efficiently implemented. That is, both the allocation function F A = f (δ) and the expected price function F P are efficiently computable over {0, 1, . . . , B} n .
The computational efficiency of F A is apparent once one realizes that the number of candidate winners, n * , can be determined in linear time.
The computational efficiency of F P requires a bit of an argument. Without loss of generality, let us show how to compute the expected price for player n. Recall that, for a bid profile v,
n is a function piece-wisely defined according to v n , since different values of v n may result in different numbers of winners n * . Assume without loss of generality that v 1 ≥ v 2 ≥ · · · ≥ v n−1 , and let n be the number of winners when player n is absent.
When v n ≤ n j=1 v j n +D δ , the proof of the monotonicity of f (δ) implies that f (δ) n = 0, so that integral below this point is zero.
When v n > n j=1 v j n +D δ , one can again see from the proof of the monotonicity of f (δ) that n * is non-increasing as a function of v n . Therefore, f (δ) n contains at most n different pieces and, for each piece with n * fixed, f (δ) n (v −n , v n ) = a + b/v n is a function that is symbolically integrable. Therefore, the only question is how to calculate the pieces for f (δ) n . Conceptually, one starts from v n = n j=1 v j n +D δ and "moves v n upwards", recording the points at which Eq. 11.2 is violated, because these are the "borders of the continuous pieces" of f (δ) n . Practically, this seemingly infinite procedure may be efficiently carried out by a line sweep method.
Conclusions
Mechanism design is undoubtedly a fascinating field. One can only marvel at the possibility that an ignorant social planner can leverage the knowledge and the rationality of the players in order to obtain the outcomes he desires. But if we want to transform this beautiful theory into strong guarantees in the real world it is important to minimize its underlying assumptions.
To us, the assumption that each player knows "on the nose" his own valuation appears to be too idealized in many an environment. Even the assumption that each player knows a probability distribution from which his own true valuation has been drawn is very strong. To be safe, we should budget for the possibility of Knightian players.
In any field, as we progress from idealized to more and more realistic models, we should expect to face additional complexities. Knightian mechanism design will be no exception. Nonetheless, we should remain optimistic. At least for single-good auctions, Knightian mechanism design is workable. (a) With n = 2 players, the second-price mechanism performs worse than randomly assigning the good for δ > 0.18. The social welfare guarantees of randomly assigning the good (ε = 1 n ), the second-price mechanism (ε = (1−δ) 2 (1+δ) 2 ), and our optimal mechanism (ε = (1−δ) 2 + 4δ n (1+δ) 2 ). In (1a) and (1b) we compare ε versus δ, and in (1c) and (1d) we compare ε versus n. The green data, our mechanism, is always better (at times significantly) than the other two mechanisms.
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